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Highlights 
• The results of a large scale laboratory tax compliance experiment conducted in the U.S., the 
U.K., Sweden, and Italy with nearly 5000 subjects are reported.  
 
• We find significant evidence of gender differences in tax compliance and the willingness to 
contribute to public goods.  
 
• We find robust evidence that tax compliance is greater for women than men.  
 
• We also find evidence that men are more willing to contribute to public goods.  
 
• Overall, the compliance effect dominates the free-riding effect for the parameters in the 
experiment such that women bear a greater burden of the provision of the public good. 
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Abstract 
The existing experimental literature suggests women are more 
compliant than men when paying taxes but may free ride more 
when contributing to public goods. It is unclear which effect 
dominates when paying for public goods through taxation. 
Experiments conducted in three European countries and the U.S. 
are used to investigate this issue. The results suggest that women 
bear a greater burden of the provision of public goods for the 
parameters in the experiment. The results indicate the gender gap 
in compliance is due to differences in both the extensive and 
intensive margins. 
 
 
 JEL codes: H2, H26, C91 
Keywords: individual income tax, public goods, gender, experiments  
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1. Introduction 
 Although economic theory is largely silent on the role that gender plays in decision-
making, there is now considerable experimental evidence of gender differences in behavior 
across a broad range of economic environments. This paper explores whether there are gender 
differences in the propensity to contribute to the provision of public goods. To answer this 
question, however, it is important to recognize that in modern societies such public goods are 
financed through taxation. Hence, a closely related, albeit distinct question arises, are there 
gender differences in the willingness to pay taxes? The provision of public goods via tax 
compliance is a particularly complex choice to examine that involves attitudes towards altruism, 
fairness, honesty, obedience, risk, and trust; all of which are dimensions of preferences that 
seem to be shaped, at least in part, by gender (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). Hence it is 
reasonable, given the findings of previous studies, to expect willingness to pay taxes and the 
resulting provision of public goods to vary by gender. The direction in which behavior will differ 
is less obvious. On one hand, results from a variety of experiments, covering a diverse array of 
motivations, are consistent with women being more willing to pay taxes. On the other hand, 
experiments exploiting public goods games suggest men may be more willing to voluntarily 
contribute to public goods. Hence, existing evidence implies there are potentially offsetting 
gender effects when it comes to provision of public goods through taxation.  
 Experimental evidence of gender differences in risk taking, competitiveness, honesty and 
obedience, all of which are indicators of tax compliance, give credence to the notion that there 
may be gender differences in the willingness to pay taxes. First, studies of risk preference 
suggest women may be more risk averse than men (Eckel and Grossman, 2008; 2015; Charness 
and Gneezy, 2012), although the majority of studies find no significant difference across genders 
(Filippin and Crosetto, 2016). Given the inherent uncertainty of the enforcement regime, a 
greater aversion to risk implies greater tax compliance. Second, there is evidence that men are 
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more competitive than women because they are more overconfident (Niederle and Vesterlund, 
3007; 2008; 2011). Such overconfidence could well translate into lower compliance when paying 
taxes if individuals underestimate their risk of audit.  Third, there  is some evidence that girls 
are more honest than boys (Bucciol and Piovesan, 2011) and women are more honest than men 
(Dreber and Johannesson, 2008); however, many experiments on lie aversion report no 
significant difference across genders (Cappelen et al., 2013; Childs, 2009; Gylfason et al., 2013). 
Still, to the extent that differences exist, an inclination towards honesty favors greater tax 
compliance. Finally, both Cadsby et al. (2006) and Karakostas and Zizzo (2016) provide 
evidence that women are more obedient to authority than men, even though the difference is 
only significant in the former study. Nonetheless, such a difference would suggest greater tax 
compliance for women than men. Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that several 
experiments report a gender compliance effect, where tax compliance is higher for female 
subjects (Alm et. al., 2009; 2010; 2012; Spicer and Becker, 1980). 
 There are two important caveats regarding the present research question that should be 
noted. First, all of the tax compliance experiments that report a gender difference were 
conducted in the U.S. Therefore, it is possible that the gender difference is culturally biased. For 
instance, Alm and Torgler (2006) report significant differences in tax compliance behavior in 
experiments conducted in the U.S. and Spain. Public goods games have also demonstrated 
varying results depending on the country in which the experiment was conducted and the 
context of the game (Brown-Kruse & Hummels 1993; Solow & Kirkwood 2002; Cadsby & 
Maynes 1998). Hence, behavioral differences in men and women can be due to differences in 
context and protocol (Croson & Gneezy 2012, 463). More importantly, none of the tax 
compliance experiments that report a gender difference use the collected taxes to finance a 
public good. Thus the question remains, is there a gender difference in the willingness to 
contribute to public goods? 
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 Several studies have attempted to address this question using experiments on public 
goods games. However, the results of these studies have been inconsistent. Both Brown-Kruse 
and Hummels (1993) and Solow and Kirkwood (2002) found evidence of a gender free-riding 
effect, where women contributed significantly less than men across all of their experimental 
treatments. On the other hand, Nowell and Tinkler (1994) reported results from a similar 
experiment that suggests women contribute more than men, if the group is composed entirely of 
females, which is an unlikely situation in the real-world. In between, Isaac et al. (1985), 
Stockard et al. (1988), and Cadsby and Maynes (1998) find no significant difference in 
contributions across genders.2 So it seems if there is a gender difference, men are more willing 
to contribute to public goods.   
 The present study is the first attempt, to our knowledge, to bridge the gap between these 
two separate but related literatures by investigating whether gender differences exist in the 
willingness to contribute to public goods through tax compliance. To explore this issue, the 
results from laboratory experiments conducted across three countries in Europe (Italy, Sweden, 
and the U.K.) and the U.S. are utilized.3 Subjects earned income in a real effort task and 
reported their income for tax purposes, which were then used to finance a public good. The size 
and scope of this study makes it the most comprehensive investigation to date. Furthermore, 
conducting experiments in multiple countries allows us to test for cultural differences in gender 
effects.  
The key to our identification strategy to distinguish willingness to pay taxes from 
willingness to contribute to public goods is to observe tax compliance in both the absence and 
presence of a public good. As in the previously cited studies, pure tax compliance is observed 
when there is no public good. Observed behavior when there is a public good is a combination of 
                                                          
2 Both Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) and Cox and Deck (2006) provide evidence that suggests these 
differences could be due to the cost of generosity.  
3 The basic experimental design has been utilized for more than 20 years (Alm et al., 1992).See Alm and 
McKee (1998) and Torgler (2002) for a review of the literature. 
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tax compliance and willingness to contribute. Therefore, the change in an individual‟s tax 
compliance behavior associated with the introduction of a pubic good (i.e., increasing the 
multiplier from zero to a positive amount) captures their willingness to contribute to the public 
good. 
 Our results suggest overall women are more willing to pay taxes and men are more 
willing to contribute to public goods. The observed gender difference in compliance is robust 
across countries and consistent with the previous literature. Contrary to conventional wisdom, 
the gender gap in compliance does not appear to be due to differences in risk aversion. 
Moreover, the analysis adds to the existing literature by demonstrating this gender difference in 
compliance is due to differences in both the extensive and intensive margins; women are less 
likely to underreport their income and do so by smaller amounts. This finding is also consistent 
across all countries in the sample. While the willingness to contribute to public goods favors 
men in all countries, the difference is only significant in Italy and Sweden. This is consistent 
with previous evidence that men are more sensitive to the cost of generosity (Andreoni and 
Vesterlund, 2001; Cox and Deck, 2006). Still, for the parameter values used in the experiment, 
women contribute more to public goods that are financed through taxation.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental 
design and formally constructs our behavioral hypotheses. Section 3 reports the results of the 
statistical analysis of behavior in the experiment. Finally, section 4 discusses the results and 
their implications for policy. 
2. Experimental Design 
2.1 Experimental Protocols 
 Our experimental design implements the fundamental elements of any voluntary tax 
reporting system.  Participants earn income by performing a clerical task, and self-report their 
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earned income to a tax authority.  Reported income is multiplied by the known tax rate to 
determine tax liability.  To investigate the propensity to contribute to public goods, reported 
taxes are collected and placed into a group fund, which is multiplied by a known multiplier, and 
then divided equally among the participants in a session.  At the end of an experimental session, 
reported income is subject to a random audit process, which performs without error.  If an audit 
occurs, underreported income is discovered, and underpaid taxes as well as the associated 
penalties are collected.  Net income is equal to earned income plus the share of the group fund 
less paid taxes and penalties, if applicable.  
  Experimental sessions consisted of 3 stages, with 3 income reporting rounds within each 
for a total of 9 income reporting rounds.  Each of the stages implements changes in a specific 
experimental parameter.  In the first stage, the public good multiplier, m, is varied, which is our 
primary focus in this analysis.  The second stage varied the tax rate and the third stage varied 
the progressivity of the tax system.  At the beginning of each stage, participants performed a 
clerical task which consisted of typing random characters into the computer.  Participants were 
paid a piece rate of 10 tokens for each line they typed correctly; the sum constituted their income 
for the three reporting rounds in a stage.  These tokens were exchanged for the domestic 
currency at a rate of 0.01 per token at the end of the experiment. 
 At the beginning of each income reporting round, participants were informed of the 
relevant experimental parameters. Specifically, they were informed that the tax rate was 30 
percent (in the first three rounds) of reported income, the probability of an audit was 5 percent 
and the fine rate on unpaid taxes was 100 percent.  In addition, they were informed of the 
multiplier, m, on the public good. That is, taxes were collected and summed, multiplied by 
   *     +, and then divided equally among the participants in a session.4  In every case, the 
                                                          
4 The marginal per capita return on the public good was 
 
 
, where N denotes the number of subjects in a 
session. Due to variation in the show-up rates across sessions and sizes of the labs across universities N 
varied from 6 to 32. 
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expected payoff is maximized by reporting zero income.5 In most sessions, the multiplier was 
increased in the first three rounds; it was 0 in the first round, 1 in the second round, and 2 in the 
third round.  As a robustness check additional sessions were conducted in Italy where the 
multiplier was decreased; it was 2 in the first round, 1 in the second round, and 0 in the third 
round. The experimental design is summarized in Table 1 below. 
   Table 1: Experimental Design 
 Stage 1 
Order 1 2 3 
A m = 0 m = 1 m = 2 
B m = 2 m = 1  m = 0 
 
 After the tax reporting rounds, subjects were tasked with 15 allocation decisions to elicit 
their „social value orientation‟ (Murphy et. al., 2011). These decisions required participants to 
choose an allocation of tokens between themselves and an anonymous partner. These tokens 
were exchanged for the domestic currency at a rate of 0.0003 per token at the end of the 
experiment. The first six decisions, depicted in Table 2, were constructed to assess whether an 
individual had primarily individualistic or prosocial/altruistic motives.6 
Table 2: Social Value Orientation Allocation Decisions 
 Allocation 
Decision 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 (85 , 85) (85 , 76) (85 , 68) (85 , 59) (85 , 50) (85 , 41) (85 , 33) (85 , 24) (85 , 15) 
2 (85 , 15) (87 , 19) (89 , 24) (91 , 28) (93 , 33) (94 , 37) (96 , 41) (98 , 46) (100 , 50) 
3 (50 , 100) (54 , 98) (59 , 96) (63 , 94) (68 , 93) (72 , 91) (76 , 89) (81 , 87) (85 , 85) 
4 (50 , 100) (54 , 89) (59 , 79) (63 , 68) (68 , 58) (72 , 47) (76 , 36) (81 , 26) (85 , 15) 
5 (100 , 50) (94 , 56) (88 , 63) (81 , 69) (75 , 75) (69 , 81) (63 , 88) (56 , 94) (50 , 100) 
6 (100 , 50) (98 , 54) (96 , 59) (94 , 63) (93 , 68) (91 , 72) (89 , 76) (87 , 81) (85 , 85) 
                                                          
5 Given the tax rate of 30%, a 5% probability of audit, and a fine rate of 100% on unpaid taxes, the 
expected payoff of subject i is  ,  -           
 
 
   ∑   
 
        (     ), where Ii denotes earned 
income and xi denotes reported income, depends on the values of m and N. For N = 6 (the minimum for 
our sample), the expected marginal benefit of reporting income is 0.03, 0.08, and 0.13 when m is 0, 1, and 
2, respectively. These values decline as N increases. Hence, given the marginal cost is 0.3, the expected 
payoff is maximized when zero income is reported. 
66
 The last nine decisions determined whether prosocial behavior was driven by inequality aversion or 
joint gain maximization. Since the motivation for prosocial behavior is not relevant for this research 
question, these decisions are omitted from Table 2 and the subsequent analysis.  
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
Table Notes: In each allocation, the first value is the number of tokens the decision-maker keeps for themselves and the second value 
is the number of tokens the other person receives. 
 
 Finally, in the six sessions that varied the treatment orders, participant‟s risk attitudes 
were elicited using a multiple price list (Andersen et. al., 2006).7 The mechanism presents 
participants with a menu of 10 choices between a binary lottery and a constant sum of money, of 
70 tokens, as shown in Table 3 below. Each binary lottery has a fixed high payout of 100 tokens 
and a fixed low payout of 40 tokens. These token amounts were chosen to approximate the 
binary choice between full compliance and full evasion of the median income earner in under 
order A sessions. Accordingly, these tokens were exchanged for domestic currency at a rate of 
0.01 per token, as in the first round of the experiment. As participants proceeded through the 
menu the probability of the high (low) payout is increased (decreased) from 0.15 to 0.95 in 
increments of 0.1 to induce subjects to switch from the safe to the risky option.8 The point at 
which a participant switches indicates their risk preference. 
 
Table 3: Multiple Price List Risk Preference Elicitation Task 
Decision Option A Option B 
1 15% chance of 100 tokens 
85% chance of 40 tokens 
70 tokens 
2 25% chance of 100 tokens 
75% chance of 40 tokens 
70 tokens 
3 35% chance of 100 tokens 
65% chance of 40 tokens 
70 tokens 
4 45% chance of 100 tokens 
55% chance of 40 tokens 
70 tokens 
5 55% chance of 100 tokens 
45% chance of 40 tokens 
70 tokens 
6 65% chance of 100 tokens 
35% chance of 40 tokens 
70 tokens 
7 75% chance of 100 tokens 
25% chance of 40 tokens 
70 tokens 
8 85% chance of 100 tokens 
15% chance of 40 tokens 
70 tokens 
9 95% chance of 100 tokens 
5% chance of 40 tokens 
70 tokens 
10 100% chance of 100 tokens 
0% chance of 40 tokens 
70 tokens 
                                                          
7
 This mechanism was made popular by Holt and Laury (2002). 
8
 The last decision involved a choice of 100% chance of winning versus the constant sum of money to 
ensure participants were paying attention. 
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 Upon the completion of the risk preference elicitation task, if administered, participants 
then proceeded to complete a survey.  The survey collected demographic information about the 
participant as well as inquired about their potential motivations regarding their behavior in the 
experiment. After completion of the survey, participants were paid individually in private. 
 The experiment was conducted in 4 different countries to control for possible cultural 
bias: U.S., U.K., Sweden, and Italy. Furthermore, the experiment was conducted in at least two 
separate universities within each country.9 Subjects were recruited by email via each lab's Online 
Recruitment System for Experimental Economics (ORSEE) (Greiner, 2004). The sessions were 
programmed and conducted with the software Z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), as well as with the 
software Behavery. Experimental sessions lasted approximately 90 minutes. Average earnings in 
the experiment were approximately $14 (USD), in addition to a $5 (USD) show-up fee.  
 
 
2.2 Behavioral Hypotheses 
 Since our primary interest is in the effect of gender on the provision of public goods 
through tax compliance, we restrict our hypotheses and analysis to the first three rounds of the 
experiment. Let the fraction of income reported by participant i in decision round j, Yij, be given 
by 
              
                
           ,  (1) 
                                                          
9 The experimental sites included Bologna Laboratory for Experiments in Social Sciences, Centro 
d'Economia Sperimentale A Roma Est, and Experimental Economics Lab of the University of Milano 
Bicocca in Italy, Oxford Experimental Laboratory, Experimental Economics Laboratory-Royal Holloway 
in London, Finance and Economics Experimental Laboratory at Exeter, and ESSEXLab at Essex in 
Britain, Learning & Experimental Economics Projects at University of California-Santa Cruz, Social 
Science Experiments Lab at University of Colorado-Boulder, Appalachian Experimental Economics 
Laboratory in Boone, North Carolina, Center for Behavioral Political Economy in Stony Brook, New York, 
and University of Hawaii Laboratory for Computer-Mediated Experiments and the Study of Culture in 
Honolulu, Hawaii, in the US, and the Behavioural lab in Stockholm and Behavioural and Experimental 
Economics in Gothenburg in Sweden. 
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where P is an indicator variable equal to one if the multiplier on the public good is equal to one; 
P2 is an indicator variable equal to one if the multiplier on the public good is equal to two; Fj is 
an indicator variable equal to one if participant j is female; PFj is an interaction variable equal to 
one if the multiplier on the public good is equal to one and participant j is female; P2Fj is an 
interaction variable equal to one if the multiplier on the public good is equal to two and 
participant j is female; Xj is a set of demographic control variables for participant j; and     is an 
unobserved error term. 
 There are two fundamental hypotheses regarding the effects of gender based on previous 
findings from experiments on public goods and tax compliance. First, we test the hypothesis that 
compliance increases with the multiplier on the public good. We state our first hypothesis 
formally as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1:        : Increasing the multiplier from zero to two on the public good 
should increase compliance for both males and females. 
 
 Second, there is growing and consistent evidence that suggests females have higher tax 
compliance. We state the second hypothesis formally as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2:     : Female participants should have a higher tax compliance rate than 
male participants. 
 
Finally, although there are mixed results in the literature, there is evidence that males 
contribute more than females to public goods. This implies that increasing the public good 
multiplier should have a greater effect for males than females. We state our third hypothesis 
formally as follows: 
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Hypothesis 3:            : Increasing the public good multiplier should increase tax 
compliance more for males than females.  
3. Results 
3.1 Analysis of Compliance Rates  
Table 4: Compliance Rate by Treatment across Countries 
 Treatment  
Country m = 0 m = 1 m = 2 Means Test 
Italy (N = 415) 0.596 (0.422) 0.660 (0.411) 0.784 (0.360) 49.11*** 
Sweden (N = 327) 0.515 (0.460) 0.640 (0.442) 0.799 (0.371) 73.15*** 
U.K. (N = 360) 0.347 (0.419) 0.430 (0.444) 0.596 (0.447) 58.80*** 
U.S. (N = 537) 0.604 (0.433) 0.691 (0.403) 0.773 (0.377) 50.27*** 
All (N = 1639) 0.528 (0.444) 0.616 (0.434) 0.742 (0.396) 224.46*** 
Table Notes: Average compliance rates for each country and treatment are reported with standard deviations in parentheses. The F-
test for equal means using subject-specific cluster-robust standard errors is reported in the fifth column with statistical significance 
indicated by asterisks: *** indicates the difference is significant at the 1% level. 
 
 We begin the analysis by reporting the average compliance rate for each value of the 
multiplier on the public good for each country and pooled across countries in Table 4. The table 
reveals the compliance rate increased significantly as the multiplier on the public good was 
increased. Overall, compliance increased by about 38% when the multiplier was increased from 
zero to two. This pattern of behavior is consistent across countries. Hence, the data appear to be 
consistent with the prediction in hypothesis 1.   
Table 5 explores whether this pattern of behavior differs by gender. Columns 2 through 4 and 6 
through 8 report female and male compliance rates, respectively, for each level of the public 
good multiplier across countries. Again, for both females and males we observe a significant 
increase in compliance as the public good multiplier increases.  
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Table 5: Compliance Rate by Gender and Treatment across Countries 
 Females   Males  
 Treatment   Treatment  
Country m = 0 m = 1 m = 2 Means 
Test 
Country m = 0 m = 1 m = 2 Means 
Test 
Italy 
(N = 146) 
0.697 
(0.393) 
0.724 
(0.395) 
0.815 
(0.348) 
10.16*** Italy 
(N = 164) 
0.389 
(0.427) 
0.527 
(0.451) 
0.712 
(0.408) 
42.51*** 
Sweden 
(N = 143) 
0.699 
(0.423) 
0.807 
(0.355) 
0.883 
(0.282) 
17.84*** Sweden 
(N = 184) 
0.372 
(0.438) 
0.511 
(0.459) 
0.734 
(0.417) 
59.56*** 
U.K. 
(N = 156) 
0.482 
(0.443) 
0.557 
(0.419) 
0.731 
(0.388) 
30.50*** U.K. 
(N = 200) 
0.234 
(0.363) 
0.325 
(0.435) 
0.487 
(0.463) 
29.26*** 
U.S. 
(N = 298) 
0.661 
(0.413) 
0.758 
(0.357) 
0.808 
(0.347) 
25.04*** U.S. 
(N = 223) 
0.507 
(0.447) 
0.592 
(0.441) 
0.714 
(0.414) 
26.51*** 
All 
(N = 743) 
0.638 
(0.425) 
0.719 
(0.387) 
0.808 
(0.348) 
80.43*** All 
(N = 771) 
0.379 
(0.431) 
0.490 
(0.457) 
0.659 
(0.438) 
148.70*** 
Table Notes: Average compliance rates for each country and treatment are reported with standard deviations in parentheses. The F-
test for equal means using subject-specific cluster-robust standard errors is reported in the fifth column with statistical significance 
indicated by asterisks: *** indicates the difference is significant at the 1% level. 
 
 Two additional patterns of behavior are evident in the table. First, in every single 
instance, the compliance rate for females is higher than the corresponding compliance rate for 
males, consistent with the behavior predicted in hypothesis 2. In particular, the female 
compliance rates are much higher when the public good is absent (m = 0). Second, there is a 
tendency for this gender gap in tax compliance to decrease as the public good multiplier 
increases, with the exception being the U.K. sample.10  Overall, comparing compliance when the 
public good multiplier is zero (m = 0) to when it is two (m = 2), the gender gap decreases by 
roughly 42%; male compliance is 41% lower than females when the multiplier is zero but only 
18% lower when the multiplier is two. This is consistent with hypothesis 3.  
 
  
                                                          
10
 The gender gap in tax compliance persists as the public good multiplier is increased in the U.K.  
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Table 6: Regression Analysis of Compliance  
Variable Italy Sweden U.K. U.S. Overall 
Constant (m = 0) 0.389*** 0.372*** 0.234*** 0.507*** 0.379*** 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.026) (0.030) (0.016) 
Single (m = 1) 0.138*** 0.139*** 0.091*** 0.085*** 0.111*** 
 (0.034) (0.030) (0.025) (0.028) (0.014) 
Double (m = 2) 0.324*** 0.362*** 0.254*** 0.207*** 0.281*** 
 (0.036) (0.034) (0.033) (0.030) (0.017) 
Female 0.308*** 0.327*** 0.248*** 0.154*** 0.259*** 
 (0.047) (0.048) (0.044) (0.038) (0.022) 
Single*Female -0.111** -0.030 -0.015 0.011 -0.030 
 (0.044) (0.042) (0.038) (0.034) (0.019) 
Double*Female -0.206*** -0.178*** -0.004 -0.060 -0.111*** 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.037) (0.022) 
R-squared 0.112 0.161 0.126 0.058 0.105 
Num. Obs. 930 981 1068 1563 4542 
Table Notes: *, **, and *** denotes estimates that are statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. Subject-specific cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
 In order to formally test our hypotheses, we estimate the model in equation 1 using 
ordinary least squares regression analysis for each country separately, as well as the overall 
pooled sample. The results are presented in Table 6.11 All models are estimated with subject-
specific cluster-robust standard errors to account for the repeated observation of participants. 
The results strongly support hypothesis 1. In all countries, there is a significant increase in 
compliance when the public good multiplier is increased from zero to one. Moreover, in all four 
countries compliance is significantly higher when the public good multiplier is two than when it 
is one.12 This is our first result. 
 
Result 1:   There is a significant increase in compliance associated with increasing the public 
good multiplier, as predicted. 
 
                                                          
11
 Table 10 in the appendix reports the results of tobit analysis as robustness check, since the dependent 
variable is bounded between 0 and 1. 
12
 In fact, compliance appears to be increasing linearly in the public good multiplier, m, given the 
estimated coefficient when m = 2 is roughly twice as large as the coefficient when m = 1. 
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 We also find strong support for hypothesis 2. In all countries, compliance for females is 
significantly greater than for males. This is our second result. 
 
Result 2:   The compliance rate of females is higher than that of males, as predicted. 
 
 The results, however, are mixed regarding hypothesis 3. Although most interaction terms 
between females and the public good multipliers reported in the fifth and sixth rows of Table 6 
are negative, they are mostly insignificant, with the exception of Italy, when the multiplier is 
one. However, we find evidence consistent with hypothesis 3 in Italy and Sweden when the 
multiplier is two.13 These results are consistent with previous evidence that males contribute 
more than females to public goods. Controlling for pure tax compliance when the public good 
multiplier is zero, the propensity to contribute to a public good, captured by the increase in 
compliance, is greater for males than females when there is a significant difference. This is our 
third result. 
 
Result 3:   When there is a significant difference between genders, the increase in compliance 
associated with an increase in the public good multiplier is greater for males than females, as 
predicted. 
 
3.2 Analysis of Extensive and Intensive Margins of Compliance 
  
  
  
                                                          
13
 Men in the U.S. stand out because they appear to be more “purely” tax compliant than in other country 
samples. Moreover, since the gender gap is quite small in the U.S. with respect to the other samples, there 
is less room for it to improve. 
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 Table 7: Extensive Margins of Compliance  
 Females  Males 
 Treatment  Treatment 
Country m = 0 m = 1 m = 2 Country m = 0 m = 1 m = 2 
Italy 
(N = 146) 
47.9 56.2 70.5 
Italy 
(N = 164) 
20.7 40.9 60.4 
Sweden 
(N = 143) 
58.0 70.6 79.7 
Sweden 
(N = 184) 
26.6 40.8 67.4 
U.K. 
(N = 156) 
32.7 37.2 58.3 
U.K. 
(N = 200) 
11.5 24.0 38.5 
U.S. 
(N = 298) 
46.3 54.7 67.4 
U.S. 
(N = 223) 
33.2 42.2 61.9 
All 
(N = 743) 
46.0 54.4 68.5 
All 
(N = 771) 
23.3 36.8 56.8 
 
 Next we investigate whether the differences in compliance rates across genders are due 
to differences in the fraction of participants underreporting their income and/or by the amount 
of income underreported (i.e., the intensive and/or extensive margins). Table 7 summarizes the 
extensive margin of compliance by gender. The table reports the proportion of participants that 
report all of their income as percentages. There are a few behavioral patterns that are 
noteworthy. First, in every country and treatment the proportion of males that report all of their 
income is smaller than the corresponding proportion of females, which is consistent with 
hypothesis 2. Second, in every single country the extensive margin of compliance increases as 
the public good multiplier is increased for both genders. Finally, in every country except the 
U.K. the gender gap in the extensive margin of compliance declines as the public good multiplier 
is increased, which is consistent with hypothesis 3. These patterns in the extensive margin of 
compliance are consistent with the compliance rates reported in Table 5. 
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     Figure 1: Cumulative Distribution of Non-Compliance by Country and Gender 
 
 Turning our attention to the intensive margin of compliance, we examine the cumulative 
distributions of compliance for each gender conditional on underreporting income. Figure 1 
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plots the distributions of non-compliance for each gender and country pooling the data across 
public good multipliers. The patterns of behavior are quite consistent across countries. In every 
instance, among participants that underreport income, the proportion that report zero income is 
greater for males than females. This is the principle reason for the difference in the 
distributions, as the cumulative distributions do not tend to converge until compliance rates are 
fairly high. Hence, when underreporting income, males underreport by larger amounts; the 
intensive margin of compliance is lower for males, consistent with hypothesis 2. 
 
  
 
     Figure 2: Cumulative Distribution of Non-Compliance by Treatment and Gender 
 
 Figure 2 plots the distributions of non-compliance for each gender and public good 
multiplier pooling the data across countries. The graphs reveal an interesting behavioral 
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asymmetry. While increasing the public good multiplier reduces the proportion of females 
reporting zero income, we observe little effect for males. Hence, the reduction of the gender gap 
in tax compliance associated with increasing the public good multiplier can be attributed to 
changes in both the extensive and intensive margins across genders. 
 
3.3 Robustness Analysis 
 In this section we explore the robustness of the main results. In particular, we examine 
whether other demographic variables such as risk attitude, social preference, political 
orientation, and attitudes toward government can account for the gender gap in tax compliance 
and propensity to contribute public goods. Furthermore, we examine whether the main results 
are robust to variation in the treatment order.  
 As previously stated, the experiment elicited various demographic variables in addition 
to gender to be used as control variables in the analysis. Participants‟ social preferences were 
elicited using the incentive compatible allocation mechanism described in Table 3.  Participants 
preferred allocation choice for the six decisions results in a continuous scale measure of their 
pro-sociality. This measure is standardized for the subsequent analysis. Moreover, the survey 
administered upon completion of the experiment asked subjects to indicate their risk attitude on 
a 10-point Likert scale. In addition, a series of questions elicited participants‟ political 
orientation, attitudes towards various government institutions, and attitudes towards tax 
compliance. Pampel et al. (2016) conduct a factor analysis of participants‟ survey responses 
which resulted in three determinants of tax compliance: (i) pro-welfare ideology (ii) duty to pay 
and (iii) trust in government. The results from including these additional demographic controls 
are shown in Table 8.14 
 
                                                          
14
 Table 11 in the appendix reports the results of tobit analysis as robustness check, since the dependent 
variable is bounded between 0 and 1. 
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Table 8: Regression Analysis of Compliance with Demographic Controls 
Variable Italy Sweden U.K. U.S. Overall 
Constant (m = 0) 0.419*** 0.391*** 0.686*** 0.626*** 0.581*** 
 (0.082) (0.093) (0.109) (0.083) (0.041) 
Single (m = 1) 0.133*** 0.139*** 0.091*** 0.085*** 0.102*** 
 (0.035) (0.030) (0.025) (0.028) (0.013) 
Double (m = 2) 0.321*** 0.362*** 0.255*** 0.207*** 0.260*** 
 (0.037) (0.034) (0.034) (0.030) (0.016) 
Female 0.253*** 0.274*** 0.166*** 0.112*** 0.174*** 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.044) (0.037) (0.020) 
Single*Female -0.102** -0.030 -0.015 0.011 -0.023 
 (0.046) (0.043) (0.038) (0.034) (0.018) 
Double*Female -0.198*** -0.178*** -0.004 -0.060 -0.095*** 
 (0.048) (0.046) (0.047) (0.037) (0.020) 
Social Preference 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Risk Preference -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.033*** -0.022*** -0.025*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) 
Income 0.000 -0.001 -0.002*** -0.001* -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Employment -0.012 -0.004 -0.017 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.043) (0.033) (0.037) (0.028) (0.016) 
Experience -0.055 -0.080** -0.125*** -0.079*** -0.104*** 
 (0.049) (0.037) (0.046) (0.028) (0.016) 
Welfare Ideology 0.045 0.096*** 0.040 0.027 0.068*** 
 (0.036) (0.032) (0.032) (0.028) (0.014) 
Duty to Pay 0.119*** 0.079** 0.089** 0.036 0.065*** 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.037) (0.028) (0.015) 
Government  -0.046 -0.050 -0.054 -0.071** -0.064*** 
Trust (0.035) (0.038) (0.037) (0.031) (0.015) 
R-squared 0.220 0.317 0.266 0.148 0.228 
Num. Obs. 882 981 1062 1563 4488 
Table Notes: *, **, and *** denotes estimates that are statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. Subject-specific cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
   
 The results of estimates of the model in equation 1 using ordinary least squares 
regression analysis for each country separately, as well as the overall combined sample. Again, 
all models are estimated with subject-specific cluster-robust standard errors to account for the 
repeated observation of participants. The main results concerning the effects of treatment 
dummies, the gender dummy, and the interactions of treatments and gender are fairly 
consistent across countries. Moreover, these results are quite consistent with the previous 
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results reported in Table 6.  The main results appear to be robust to the inclusion of additional 
demographic controls.  
 Nonetheless, the additional demographic controls are significantly correlated with tax 
compliance. Social and risk preferences are both consistently and significantly correlated with 
tax compliance in the anticipated directions. Pro-social preferences, risk aversion, and 
obligatory attitudes towards tax payments are all positively correlated with tax compliance.15 
Trust in government is significantly correlated with compliance in the U.K. and the U.S. 
Additionally, there is some evidence that favorable attitudes towards the welfare state are 
positively correlated with compliance in Sweden.  
 Finally, the robustness of the results to variation in the treatment order is investigated. 
As previously stated, six additional sessions were conducted in Italy using treatment order B in 
Table 9.16 In addition to varying the treatment order, these sessions included an incentive 
compatible risk preference elicitation mechanism shown in Table 3 to further verify that risk 
attitudes are not a determinant of the gender gap in tax compliance. Three models are estimated 
using ordinary least squares with subject-specific cluster-robust standard errors to account for 
the repeated observation of participants. The first model estimates simple treatment effects, the 
second allows the treatment effects to vary by gender, and the third allows the treatment effects 
to vary by gender while controlling for additional demographics.17 
 
 
  
                                                          
15
 The negative coefficients on risk preference indicates that as risk aversion declines so does compliance. 
16
 Table 12 in the appendix reports the results of tobit analysis as robustness check, since the dependent 
variable is bounded between 0 and 1. 
17
 We allowed these demographic effects to vary by gender. Only social preference had a significant 
interaction with gender, the remainder were jointly insignificant and hence dropped from the model. 
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 Table 9: Regression Analysis of Compliance for Treatment Order B 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant (m = 0) 0.539*** 0.549*** 0.071 
 (0.053) (0.057) (0.151) 
Single (m = 1) 0.082*** 0.076 0.080 
 (0.031) (0.052) (0.061) 
Double (m = 2) 0.067** 0.041 0.036 
 (0.033) (0.052) (0.060) 
Female 0.216*** 0.196*** 0.458*** 
 (0.062) (0.071) (0.133) 
Single*Female  0.011 0.022 
  (0.063) (0.073) 
Double*Female  0.047 0.066 
  (0.067) (0.078) 
Social Preference   0.014*** 
   (0.004) 
Social Preference*   -0.012** 
Female   (0.005) 
Risk Preference   0.030* 
   (0.016) 
Welfare Ideology   -0.020 
   (0.060) 
Duty to Pay   -0.036 
   (0.045) 
Government Trust   -0.070 
   (0.060) 
R-squared 0.084 0.085 0.220 
Num. Obs. 360 360 300 
Table Notes: *, **, and *** denotes estimates that are statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. Subject-specific cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
 In general, the results in Table 9 lend further support to the main results. All the models 
indicate there is an increase in compliance when the public good multiplier is increased from 
zero, although the effect is only significant in the first model. All the models indicate female 
compliance is significantly greater than that of males, even when controlling for risk preference. 
Hence, gender gap in tax compliance is particularly robust. Unlike the results from treatment 
order A, there is no significant evidence that males are more sensitive to the return on the public 
good in treatment order B.  
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4. Discussion 
 We began with the question, are there gender differences in willingness to pay for public 
goods through taxation? There are reasons to think they should exist, but predicting the 
direction in which the genders differ is problematic. On one hand, there is evidence that women 
are more compliant when it comes to reporting their income for tax purposes. On the other 
hand, there is also evidence that women may be more willing to free-ride when it comes to 
voluntarily contributing to the provision of public goods. Given the potential for these two 
effects to offset each other, it remains an open empirical question as to which dominates when 
public goods are financed through taxation. 
 To investigate the issue, we utilize data from laboratory experiments conducted in Italy, 
Sweden, U.K. and the U.S.  Subjects earned income in a real effort task and reported their 
income for tax purposes, which were either used to finance a public good or not. Consequently, 
we are able to separately identify tax compliance from willingness to contribute to the public 
good. The size and scope of this study makes it the most comprehensive investigation to date. 
Furthermore, conducting experiments in multiple countries allows us to test for cultural 
differences in gender effects. 
 The results suggest that women pay more for public goods, although men may be more 
sensitive to the price of provision. Of course, this conclusion is constrained to the parameter 
values used in the experiment; it could be true than men pay more for larger marginal per capita 
returns from the public good. Nonetheless, we find robust evidence across countries in the 
sample that women are more compliant when paying taxes. On the other hand, there is only 
significant difference across genders in the willingness to contribute to public goods in Italy and 
Sweden; suggesting culture may be an important factor. The data analysis reveals the gender 
gap in compliance is due to differences in both the extensive and intensive margins; men are 
more likely to underreport their income and when they do, they tend to evade all of their tax 
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liability. Finally, contrary to conventional wisdom, a robustness analysis indicates the gender 
gap in compliance is not due to differences in risk aversion.  
 Of course, the extent to which these results can be applied beyond the laboratory 
depends on the degree of “parallelism” to the naturally occurring world (Smith, 1982; Plott 
1987). The experimental setting need not attempt to capture all of the variation in the naturally 
occurring environment, but it should sufficiently recreate the fundamental elements if the 
results are to be relevant in policy debates. Our experimental design implements the 
fundamental elements of any voluntary tax reporting system. Moreover, there is evidence of the 
external validity of this decision setting (Alm, Bloomquist, and McKee, 2015). Hence, we feel 
confident that the reported behavior is likely to occur outside of the lab as well. 
 The robustness of the gender gap in tax compliance has important policy implications. 
Modern societies continue to be plagued by tax evasion and reducing the tax gap continues to be 
a principle object of tax revenue agencies in all countries. As welfare states adapt to a 
challenging set of demographic, economic, and fiscal pressures, a state‟s ability to extract 
revenue from its citizens is crucial to sustaining a well-functioning welfare regime. While 
policies are typically focused on improving the enforcement regime, this research highlights the 
potential for a different avenue for policy makers. By improving labor market outcomes such as 
wage gaps and labor force participation rates for women, governments can potentially make 
significant reductions in tax gaps, given tax compliance is higher for women.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 10: Tobit Regression Analysis of Compliance  
Variable Italy Sweden U.K. U.S. Overall 
Constant (m = 0) 0.123 -0.058 -0.482*** 0.487*** 0.058 
 (0.107) (0.159) (0.130) (0.089) (0.058) 
Single (m = 1) 0.499*** 0.625*** 0.315*** 0.262*** 0.401*** 
 (0.116) (0.151) (0.105) (0.086) (0.054) 
Double (m = 2) 1.131*** 1.740*** 0.929*** 0.734*** 1.049*** 
 (0.150) (0.224) (0.146) (0.108) (0.072) 
Female 0.929*** 1.439*** 0.922*** 0.473*** 0.885*** 
 (0.158) (0.257) (0.175) (0.118) (0.082) 
Single*Female -0.347** -0.001 -0.047 0.036 -0.095 
 (0.152) (0.229) (0.137) (0.109) (0.071) 
Double*Female -0.539*** -0.573** -0.040 -0.169 -0.312*** 
 (0.178) (0.262) (0.172) (0.128) (0.085) 
Psuedo R-squared 0.058 0.082 0.061 0.031 0.052 
Num. Obs. 930 981 1068 1563 4542 
Table Notes: *, **, and *** denotes estimates that are statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. Subject-specific cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 11: Tobit Analysis of Compliance with Demographic Controls 
Variable Italy Sweden U.K. U.S. Overall 
Constant (m = 0) 1.100*** 1.519*** 1.198*** 1.088*** 1.210*** 
 (0.082) (0.141) (0.084) (0.061) (0.042) 
Single (m = 1) 0.483*** 0.609*** 0.320*** 0.268*** 0.394*** 
 (0.115) (0.148) (0.104) (0.086) (0.053) 
Double (m = 2) 1.116*** 1.712*** 0.924*** 0.732*** 1.040*** 
 (0.151) (0.222) (0.147) (0.108) (0.072) 
Female 0.719*** 1.089*** 0.603*** 0.334*** 0.624*** 
 (0.152) (0.227) (0.159) (0.110) (0.075) 
Single*Female -0.323** 0.028 -0.047 0.022 -0.087 
 (0.151) (0.223) (0.136) (0.108) (0.071) 
Double*Female -0.524*** -0.554** -0.055 -0.178 -0.318*** 
 (0.180) (0.255) (0.169) (0.127) (0.085) 
Social Preference 0.016*** 0.043*** 0.025*** 0.019*** 0.025*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) 
Risk Preference -0.081*** -0.100** -0.123*** -0.073*** -0.095*** 
 (0.028) (0.042) (0.034) (0.022) (0.015) 
Income 0.001 -0.004 -0.007*** -0.003** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Employment -0.067 -0.046 -0.021 0.003 0.018 
 (0.139) (0.170) (0.133) (0.094) (0.062) 
Experience -0.199 -0.397** -0.437** -0.272*** -0.348*** 
 (0.161) (0.199) (0.173) (0.094) (0.069) 
Welfare Ideology 0.154 0.483*** 0.151 0.098 0.260*** 
 (0.124) (0.161) (0.126) (0.093) (0.058) 
Duty to Pay 0.360*** 0.434** 0.309** 0.186** 0.316*** 
 (0.119) (0.180) (0.141) (0.092) (0.061) 
Government  -0.141 -0.218 -0.199 -0.221** -0.229*** 
Trust (0.120) (0.203) (0.140) (0.103) (0.062) 
Psuedo  
R-squared 0.116 0.182 0.146 0.082 0.131 
Num. Obs. 882 981 1062 1563 4488 
Table Notes: *, **, and *** denotes estimates that are statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. Subject-specific cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 12: Tobit Regression Analysis of Compliance for Treatment Order B 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant (m = 0) 0.674*** 0.773*** -0.424 
 (0.112) (0.113) (0.342) 
Single (m = 1) 0.139* 0.008 0.012 
 (0.084) (0.121) (0.138) 
Double (m = 2) 0.114 -0.065 -0.082 
 (0.086) (0.127) (0.144) 
Female 0.524*** 0.333** 0.839*** 
 (0.151) (0.144) (0.276) 
Single*Female  0.251 0.317* 
  (0.171) (0.187) 
Double*Female  0.348** 0.420** 
  (0.176) (0.193) 
Social Preference   0.028*** 
   (0.009) 
Social Preference*   -0.028** 
Female   (0.011) 
Risk Preference   0.094** 
   (0.042) 
Welfare Ideology   -0.026 
   (0.146) 
Duty to Pay   -0.092 
   (0.097) 
Government Trust   -0.178 
   (0.128) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.039 0.042 0.111 
Num. Obs. 360 360 300 
Table Notes: *, **, and *** denotes estimates that are statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. Subject-specific cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
